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CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION
States have not in the past been willing, and are not now pre-
pared, to accord visiting armed forces blanket immunity from
their criminal jurisdiction, at least in time of peace, except in
special circumstances. A receiving state violates no rule of in-
ternational law in taking this position.
Since a state can deny to any other state the right to station
armed forces in its territory, it can couple a grant of the right
with the requirement that mutually satisfactory arrangements be
made with respect to jurisdiction over the visiting forces. Con-
troversy can arise, however, on the understanding to be implied
when foreign troops are permitted to enter a state without an
explicit agreement governing their status having been made. The
sending state is, it seems clear, entitled to enforce its law through
courts-martial sitting in the receiving state. To this end, the
military authorities of the sending state may exercise a limited
police power over the visiting forces and may summon members
of the force as witnesses. Comparable powers may perhaps be
exercised over civilians accompanying the visiting force and over
dependents. The sending state has no such power with respect to
others, except perhaps in extreme cases, e.g., in a combat zone
in time of war. The receiving state has no, or at most a limited,
supervisory jurisdiction over the visiting forces. The receiving
state may, for example, have jurisdiction to decide whether the
accused is in fact a member of the visiting force.
The receiving state, it seems equally clear, has concurrent juris-
diction over the visiting forces except perhaps in special cir-
cumstances. Put another way, no blanket immunity is to be im-
plied from the grant of permission to station troops in the re-
ceiving state. The immunity may exist with respect to troops in
passage, or in time of war in a combat zone. The immunity ap-
pears also to be recognized with respect to the crews of warships
for acts which occur on board the warship, but not with respect
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to armed forces on a base. Whether the immunity will be implied
where the act was done in the performance of duty is unsettled.
Where there is concurrent jurisdiction, international law pro-
vides no rule for resolving the conflict.
That there is so much doubt in this whole area is under-
standable. The sending state has an obvious interest in seeking
to keep complete control over its armed forces at all times. The
receiving state has an equally obvious interest in claiming con-
current jurisdiction. All of the considerations which support the
territorial principle bolster the receiving state's claim. These
considerations center around two basic ideas. One is the interest
of the receiving state in protecting both the state and the lives
and property of its citizens and residents. The other is that
justice can be administered most effectively at the place of the
crime. The weight to be given these conflicting interests can, of
course, vary with the circumstances, and the circumstances in
which armed forces are stationed abroad can and do differ over
a very wide range.
All of this explains and justifies the recent practice of allocating
jurisdiction over visiting forces by formal agreements. An agree-
ment can both resolve the doubts which exist in the absence of
agreement, and also take into account the particular circum-
stances.
The status of forces agreements which have been entered into
since World War II are illuminating with respect to the con-
sensus of states as to the proper allocation of jurisdiction. They
suggest that in special circumstances complete immunity for the
visiting force may be appropriate. They also suggest that in
other circumstances, as where a large force is to be stationed in
a receiving state for an indefinite period, the situation is rela-
tively stable, and a common language or cultural background
make likely much intermingling of the troops and the local popula-
tion, only a limited immunity will normally be accorded the
visiting forces.
The most interesting development reflected in the status of
forces agreements, in the light of much that has been written on
the subject of jurisdiction, is the readiness of receiving states to
accord immunity (or priority of jurisdiction in the sending state)
with respect to inter se offenses. Receiving states have also
shown a perhaps less marked willingness to recognize the on-base
concept, either as alone justifying according exclusive or prior
265
jurisdiction to the sending state, or at least as an added factor
supporting according such jurisdiction to the sending state over
inter se offenses committed on a base. These attitudes are in
marked contrast to the reluctance of receiving states to recog-
nize such jurisdiction in the sending state over duty-connected
offenses. Much of the reluctance arises from a state's interest in
protecting its citizens from the criminal acts of the visiting forces,
even though the acts were done in performance of duty. A part
of the reluctance stems, however, from the difficulties encountered
in defining the concept, determining which acts fall within it,
and deciding who is empowered to make the decision on whether
a particular act was or was not duty-connected. Many misunder-
standings could be avoided if these matters could be clarified.
The large number of waivers that receiving states have granted
suggests they are prepared to yield jurisdiction to a sending state
in many cases which fall outside the inter se, on-base, and duty-
connected categories. The wide use of waivers as a substitute for
an agreed allocation of jurisdiction is undesirable, since it some-
times permits irrelevant or improper considerations to influence
the decision. Several recent agreements mark the beginning of an
effort to deal with this problem. Neither these first attempts nor
any of several alternative approaches suggest, however, that es-
tablishing new categories or guidelines for the allocation of juris-
diction will be easy. It may be that more experience is needed
before these efforts are likely to be successful. In the meantime,
the practice initiated in Italy of exercising discretion in asking
for waivers, rather than asking waivers in all cases involving
American troops, is a step in the right direction.
It should be kept in mind always that the status of forces
problem concerns the issue of jurisdiction, not that of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. All the evidence shows that visiting
forces are characteristically treated as fairly—and at least as
leniently—when they are tried in a civil court of an ally as
when they are tried by their own courts-martial. Moreover, rela-
tions among the nations of the Free World are a crucial factor
in the cold war which makes it necessary that troops be stationed
abroad. Insisting that the members of these forces can be tried
only by courts-martial of the sending states, if the insistence is
based on any ground other than demonstrable military exigency,
can trouble those relations. Also, making a major incident of
case after case in which a member of a visiting force is held for
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trial in a receiving state's court is destructive of discipline. The
threat of nuclear war requires a higher rather than lower level
of discipline in the Free World's armed forces. Obviously, the
ultimate solution to many of the status of forces problems would
be the attainment of a standard of discipline which reduces to
an absolute minimum the cases in which a member of an armed
force violates the law of any state. In the meantime, it is sug-
gested that two lines of approach will be most helpful. One is to
try to identify additional classes of cases which both sending and
receiving states may be prepared to agree should come under the
exclusive or primary jurisdiction of one or the other. The second
is to improve the administrative and enforcement provisions of
status of forces agreements. Much can be done in this area to
eliminate friction without the sacrifice of any significant interest
of any state.
